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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on an earlier essay, this paper analyzes the relevance of the European 
integration experience for East Asia's future security architecture. It argues that the 
process of European security integration provides useful lessons that can inform a similar 
process in East Asia. In particular the paper suggests that the East Asians, much like their 
European counterparts, need to deal more effectively with their historical legacies and 
thereby create a solid foundation for integration to take off. 
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Transcending Historical Legacies: A Blueprint from Europe? 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relevance of the European integration 
experience for East Asia's future security architecture.  The study asks what led European 
integration to take off in ways not found elsewhere (what made and still makes it work in 
Europe?) and what can this experience tell us about future East Asian security 
institutions?  In a nutshell, the paper argues that the process of European security 
integration provides useful lessons that can inform a similar process in East Asia.  
In an earlier paper (Weber 2007), I scrutinized the sophisticated multi-level   
governance literature scholars draw on so heavily in the European context.  I then 
investigated Europe’s institutional history from the early post-1945 period to the present 
and, extrapolating from the governance literature, tried to ascertain which European 
institutional arrangements might be copied in East Asia.  I argued that a better 
understanding of the complex security relations in East Asia is contingent on the "cross-
fertilization" of multi-level governance approaches with ideational and psychological 
conceptual frameworks.  In doing so, I affirmed the need for "eclectic theorizing" 
(Katzenstein and Sil 2004) to make sense of East Asian security affairs, or, as Buzan and 
Waever (2003: 14) put it, the need to "mix" materialist and constructivist approaches. 
Given that there are significant differences between post-1945 Europe and 21st 
century East Asia--including the U.S.'s promotion of regional institutions in Europe 
versus bilateral alliances in East Asia (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002); more or less 
equal power capabilities in Europe versus the huge power asymmetry with respect to 
China in Asia; a fairly homogeneous European culture versus a heterogeneous Asian 
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non-traditional security threats in East Asia, etc.--the East Asians are unlikely to copy the 
exact same steps taken by the Europeans to improve their security, i.e., one model does 
not fit all.  Nor does the promotion of stability/peace-building have to be unidirectional--
economic cooperation, for instance, does not necessarily have to precede security 
cooperation.   
Since history--due to Japan's troubled past with its neighbors, and the creation of 
two Koreas and two Chinas--is still a "neuralgic point in East Asia" (Berger, 2006: 3), it 
is argued that Japanese, Koreans and Chinese can be expected to develop a distinct path 
to stabilize the region.  And yet, considering the multi-faceted nature of security threats, 
the main ingredient of the European success strategy, namely the institutionalization of 
trust on multiple levels, and hence the creation of a complex web of governance (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003), is likely to be emulated in the long run. 
While institutions are being created to enhance transparency, efficiency and trust, 
the paper argues, it is of utmost importance that the East Asians address their historical 
legacies to promote security.  Japan, in particular, more effectively and credibly needs to 
deal with its war guilt, while Chinese and Koreans are receptive to apologies from Japan.  
As Berger (2006) and Kaiser (2006) convincingly demonstrate in the German case, the 
dynamics of historical memory are quite complex.  Germany has spent decades trying to 
come to terms with its war guilt by engaging in reeducation efforts, begging forgiveness, 
providing monetary compensation, building museums, etc.  It is conceivable that this 
European experience, by building a solid foundation for further integration, may inform 
East Asia, i.e., that Japan may emulate the German model--rewrite its text books, extend 
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to the Yasukuni shrine, etc.  However, it is also plausible that Japan may prefer to take a 
different path and rely on different types of restitution.  In any event, it is hypothesized 
that addressing this divisive issue, at a minimum, will help bring about greater 
cooperation and that, much like in the European case, dealing with historical legacies 
may in fact be necessary for the creation of structurally sophisticated security 
arrangements.  
Here the literature on reconciliation is pertinent.  As Long and Brecke (2003: 
124), for instance, make clear, "[e]motions and reason are not generally antagonistic; they 
are complementary. … Emotions recognize challenges and opportunities in our 
environment, and they identify our preferences."  This then suggests that governance 
structures may be determined by much more than cost/benefit analyses of rational actors, 
namely also actors' emotions.  Since Japan’s apologies thus far have appeared “ad hoc 
and made grudgingly under international/regional pressure” (Suzuki 2007: 9), it can be 
hypothesized that resurfacing history problems, and emotional needs stemming from 
them, may have to be taken care of before institutional structures requiring a significant 
degree of commitment can be built.  Or, put differently, the settlement of historical 
disputes may be a necessary prerequisite before further security cooperation can be 
achieved, but is unlikely to be sufficient.   
In sum, the paper argues for a two-pronged strategy to enhance East Asian 
security: (1) dealing with historical legacies and war guilt—the topic of this paper; and 
(2) building trust via institutions (see Weber 2007).  Since confidence-building, as the 
European case makes abundantly clear, does not happen over night, the goal is to remove 
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mutual respect, trust and tolerance.  Over time, and commensurate with their threat 
perception(s), East Asians may graduate to more sophisticated security arrangements to 
dilute, absorb and/or contain conflict and to reduce the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior.  Thus, in the long run, East Asia may also end up with a complex web of 
governance and “thick alphabet soup of international agencies” (Ullman 1991: 145) to 
promote peace, but, due to the differences between post-1945 Europe and 21st century 
East Asia mentioned above, unique indigenous developments, and significant changes in 
the international environment since the Europeans began their institution-building, this 
web/soup is unlikely to be a carbon copy of the European one.   
After addressing an important caveat, I conduct a mini case study of Japan.  
Specifically, I examine historical legacies that still stand in the way of closer cooperation 
and, comparing Japan’s attempts at reconciliation with those of Germany, seek to make a 
number of policy recommendations.  
 
Caveat: Asia is NOT Europe 
  As Friedberg (1993/94: 7) correctly emphasizes, “what is true of Europe may not 
be true for other parts of the world.”  In Europe, he insists, there are various factors 
(democratic governments; equality; dense web of institutions, etc.) that mitigate 
instability, whereas in Asia, “many of these same soothing forces are either absent or of 
dubious strength and permanence” (ibid).  France and Germany used to care about 
Alsace/Lorraine but, we are told (Friedberg 1993/94: 16-18), have long since moved 
beyond these differences.  Not so in East Asia.  Rather than to “converg[e] on a single, 
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each constructing a history that serves its own national purposes (ibid, p. 18).  And, to 
make matters worse, there is the timing of institutionalization.  In Europe this process 
occurred soon after World War II and continues to this day, whereas the East Asians got 
a much later start (ibid. p. 22). 
  Kang (2003) could not agree more with Friedberg’s assessment.  “Because 
Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international 
relations,” Kang (2003: 58) laments, “scholars have often simply deployed concepts, 
theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and 
explain Asia,” a practice he finds “problematic at best.”  “Eurocentric ideas,” in his mind 
seem to have obfuscated rather than aided our understanding of Asian alliance behavior 
in that they have “yielded several mistaken conclusions and predictions.” 
  And yet, there are parallels between Europe and Asia.  Case in point the 
Franco/German versus the Sino/Japanese axis.  Just because China and Japan have not 
“begun to deal with their poisoned historical relations” (Kaiser 2006: 90), this does not 
imply that they could not learn from France and Germany’s behavior in the aftermath of 
World War II.  In fact, it is nonsensical to assume that Asia would discount valuable 
insights to be gained from the European experience, begin from scratch when it comes to 
trust and institution-building and “reinvent the wheel.” 
  As Kaiser (2006: 90) makes clear, European history does provide important 
lessons for Sino-Japanese relations, particularly when it comes to “dealing with the past 
and the question of guilt, nationalism, integration and political leadership.”  He, for 
instance, explains that, although Japanese officials repeatedly have asked their neighbors 
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“because they were not fully internalized by Japanese society as a whole” (ibid, p. 91-2).  
Kaiser then outlines a number of steps (issuance of formal apology, monetary 
compensation, preservation of memory, creation of trust, etc.) that were essential in 
bringing about reconciliation between Germany and its neighbors and, in his mind, are 
applicable to Sino-Japanese relations.  These steps, along with other literatures on 
reconciliation, will be scrutinized in greater detail below. 
 
Mini Case Study: Japan 
Historical Legacies 
As Jansen (2002: 512) makes clear, “[t]hroughout history Japan’s stability had 
been related to that of China.”  The problem of China, specifically “China-centrism,” was 
of utmost importance.  Since China viewed itself as “the cultural center of the universe 
and …all non-Chinese [as] ‘uncivilized’ barbarians,” and insisted on the “preeminence of 
the Middle Kingdom and a tributary system of foreign relations” (Vohra 2000: 24), 
Japan-China relations for centuries were characterized by the threat of invasion and 
warfare.  
Particularly damaging for Asian relations was the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.  For 
China, according to Vohra (2000: 66), this war meant “[a] crippling defeat at the hands of 
the ‘dwarf’ Asian barbarians, who had historically been looked down on as vastly inferior 
to the [Chinese].”  Not surprisingly, therefore, China a year later signed a secret defense 
treaty with Russia but, ultimately, could not prevent its territory from becoming divided 
into “spheres of influence” by foreign powers (Vohra 2000: 81). 
  7  The image of Japan by its neighbors suffered further and, as Jansen (2002: 515) 
argues, “lasting damage” as a result of Japan’s actions during World War I (which Japan 
was committed to join to make good on its alliance with the United Kingdom) and its 
aftermath.  Rather than to return bases it had seized from Germany to China at the end of 
the war, Japan elected to keep these holdings in its possession for a number of years.  
And although the Kellogg-Briand Pact (of which Japan was one of the original 15 
signatories), by “renounc[ing] war as an instrument of national policy,” may have given 
Japan’s neighbors some hope that the country may be turning over a new leaf, all hope 
was shattered in the early 1930s when Japan decided to conquer Manchuria to develop a 
resource base to prepare for war with the USSR (Jansen 2002: 527, 580).  Fearing the 
Soviet Union and communism, in November 1936 Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact 
with Germany.  Shortly thereafter, Japan began to encroach on China’s northern 
provinces and, in July 1937, was at war with China that lasted until the US defeated 
Japan in 1945.  Korea, which had come under Japanese rule in 1894 when the Chinese 
lost their influence over Seoul, likewise, was not liberated until 1945. 
  What needs to be understood is that the atrocities committed by the Japanese 
against the Koreans (discussed elsewhere) and the Chinese, to this day, cause hatred and 
suspicion.  Particularly gruesome—and thus still an issue in Sino-Japanese relations 
today--was the fall of Nanking (Nanjing) to Japanese armies in December 1937.  In what 
came to be known as the “Rape of Nanjing,” victorious troops committed unspeakable 
crimes “against a totally unarmed and helpless civilian population and disarmed 
prisoners-of-war.”…[A]t least “20,000 women were raped once or repeatedly…and many 
thousands of men, women and children, and POWs were ruthlessly butchered.”…”Within 
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more than 340,000 Chinese POWs and civilians” (Vohra 2000: 164).   Prisoners were 
systematically mistreated and the disclosure by Korean and Chinese “comfort women” 
demanding restitution became a big problem for Japan in the 1990s (Jansen 2002: 656) 
and continues to this day. 
  Contrary to what happened in Europe where shared history helped to promote 
reconciliation, the steps taken thus far by China and Japan (war crimes trials, postwar 
reparations, peace treaty) have been “flawed and incomplete” (Rose 2005, 11).  Hence 
the history problem resurfaces and, as Vohra (2000: 299) points out, in practically every 
top-level meeting the Chinese admonish their Japanese counterparts never to forget 
Japan’s wartime record.  Although some Chinese believe that Japan has apologized 
enough (Rose 2005, 108), most Chinese feel strongly that Japan has to come to terms 
with its past and “face up to history” to aid in the normalization of relations between the 
two countries.  As long as “a sizeable segment of the population feels little remorse and 
vehemently opposes any apology” (Kristof 1998: 39), “conservative elements in 
Japan…ma[ke] frequent efforts to deny the history of Japanese aggression” (Wu 2000: 
297), numerous Japanese continue to believe that their country’s “purpose for invading 
its neighbors was…entirely noble” (freeing them from Western colonizers), and “cabinet 
ministers march to the Yasukuni Shrine” (Kristof 1998: 40), China’s resentment and 
mistrust of Japan is unlikely to diminish.  Until serious change comes about, the Chinese 
can be expected to maximize their political utility by playing the “history card.”
1  
                                                 
1 Note that there is a large literature that argues that China uses Japan’s historical legacy 
to enhance its own domestic legitimacy.  See, for instance, Shambaugh 1996, Rose 1998, 
and Zhao 2000. 
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Not necessarily.  A significant number of Japanese and Chinese people appear to be 
ready to move on, confront and transcend the past, and work toward a better, more 
cooperative future.  Assuming that the time has come to tackle the vexing problem of war 
guilt before further “apology fatigue” on the part of Japan (Green 1999: 158) creates 
additional obstacles, what concrete steps should East Asia take to transcend this 
significant hurdle that stands in the way of greater cooperation? 
  Here, the paper argues, European history can provide useful lessons for East Asia.  
Clearly, Europeans have come a long way from the dark days of World War II.  They 
managed to deal with the past, make amends, and reestablish trust by giving rise to 
supranational institutions, thereby “forging new identities that extend beyond traditional 
ethnic and national boundaries” (Lebow 2006: 4).  As will be discussed below, over the 
course of several decades, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and, since 1990, a 
unified Germany, undertook a variety of steps to confront its past, reach out to those who 
were harmed so gravely during the Nazi regime, and pledged never to commit such 
crimes again.  As members of the nation in whose name atrocities were committed most 
Germans understand their responsibility to guard against the possibility of repetition and, 
no longer being the actual perpetrators of these crimes, they also appear to be 
reformulating their identity (Barkan and Karn 2006: 10).   
  In the following section the paper examines three crucial elements of 
reconciliation: (1) remembrance/truth seeking; (2) restitution/justice; and (3) 
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2  Comparing various steps taken by Germany and Japan in 
settling their historical legacies, the paper makes clear why the latter thus far has been 
unable to successfully transcend its past. 
 
Remembrance/Truth Seeking 
As Rose (2005: 2) points out, there have been very different interpretations of the 
events of 1931-1945 in China and Japan (as well as within Japan) and Japanese national 
memory, for several decades, has been a significant stumbling block for improved 
relations with Japan’s neighbors.  World War II from Japan’s perspective (also known as 
the “Great East Asian War” or the “Pacific War”) was viewed as “freeing Asia from the 
oppressive domination of the West” (Jansen 2002: 626).  Since the Chinese were weak 
and had allowed themselves to become enslaved by the West, Japan, thinking of East 
Asia in terms of a “single house,” had the duty to “liberate” China (Vohra 2000: 161).  At 
the same time, Japan portrayed itself as the victim of nuclear attacks, rather than 
aggressor.   
During the Tokyo trials the suffering of Chinese and other Asian victims. 
(‘comfort women,’ forced laborers, victims of biological experiments) was completely 
ignored (Rose 2005: 36).  The trials not only failed to bring about justice, but led to what 
many scholars have termed Japan’s “collective amnesia” for 40 years (Rose 2005: 37).  
  To make matters worse, the content of Japanese history textbooks ever since the 
Ministry of Education obtained the authority to screen them in 1953 has been highly 
controversial.  Encouraged to adopt a “patriotic tone,” and to “soften…Japan’s excesses 
                                                 
2 For an in depth study on Sino-Japanese relations which uses these three elements of 
reconciliation, see Rose 2005. 
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Nanjing massacre a “fabrication” (Ienaga 1996: 332).  The most recent revision of high 
school textbooks that caused a stir centers around the Imperial Army’s responsibility in 
the Battle of Okinawa.  Instead of acknowledging the Army’s role in ordering civilians to 
commit mass suicide in the final weeks of WW II, the textbooks now merely state that 
“mass killings and suicides took place among the residents” (Financial Times April 2, 
2007: 6).  This “biased historiography,” time and again has led to calls by Chinese and 
other Asian victims for factual accuracy (Ienaga 1996: 348).
3
  In Germany there were the Nuremberg trials (1945-46), followed later by the 
Eichmann (1961) and Auschwitz (1963-65) trials, but Germans, for the most part, tried to 
come to terms with their past in post-war debates about the Nazi period and the 
Holocaust (Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung) which occurred in distinct stages.  As 
Kansteiner (2006: 108) explains, in the 1950s the FRG experienced a period of 
“communicative silence” about the burden of the past.  More concretely, “the 
consequences of war and ‘war crimes’ were acknowledged by the new political elites
4 in 
their dealings with their Allied supervisors, but not necessarily in communications with 
the German population” (ibid).  In 1959 the appearance of anti-Semitic graffiti caused the 
German government to introduce educational reforms and, in the 1960s, a group of 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion of the textbook issue see Rose 2005 chapter 3. 
4 Katzenstein (2005: 86-7) explains that the political class in Germany after 1945 was 
recruited from democratic parties during the Weimar Republic and therefore largely 
consisted of people who had been imprisoned or in exile during the Nazi dictatorship.  
These people had an interest in talking about Germany’s “problematic past” and wanted 
the history books to reflect adequately what had happened during the Nazi period.  In 
Japan, on the other hand, the political class remained largely unchanged after the war, 
“except for the very top leadership,” and the government therefore favored “textbooks 
that expressed a strong, nationalist historiography.”    
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been involved in any crimes—became more vocal and sought to bring about further 
changes in the educational system (Kansteiner 2006: 112).  
  Moreover, German historians wrote “world-renowned” histories on the Holocaust 
and, aside from unearthing the historical facts, encouraged Germany to confront its past 
(Bindenagel 2006: 306).  Since Germany cannot escape its historical legacy, German 
politicians reminded German citizens time and again, they have to deal with it squarely.  
In a speech on May 8, 1985, the 40
th anniversary of the end of World War II, German 
President Richard von Weizsaecker stressed: “All of us, whether guilty or not, whether 
old or young, must accept the past.  We are all affected by its consequences and held 
responsible for it” (Bindenagel 2006: 290). 
In the 1970s, the student movement assured that discussions of personal guilt 
would not be dodged.  It was important that a “clear distinction be made between those 
who committed crimes and the nation they came from” (Kaiser 2006: 92).  Since guilt is 
individual rather than collective, one needs to differentiate guilty perpetrators and their 
descendants.  Although the latter hold responsibility for the future, Kaiser (2006: 93) 
makes clear, they are absolved from responsibility for the past.  To guard against the 
possibility of repetition, the German government decreed that it is a crime to deny the 
Holocaust, endorses full archival openness to make sure information relating to 
Germany’s dark past will not be distorted, and continues to work hard to create new 
relationships of trust.  Projects on common history textbooks are on-going, and town 
partnerships, youth and teacher exchange programs--created decades ago to combat the 
revival of nationalism--are still going strong.  
  13 
Restitution/Justice 
  Under the Potsdam declaration, the Allied powers decided that Japan would have 
to hand over assets and capital which would then be dispersed as reparations.  Between 
January 1948 and September 1949 China received $22.5 million worth of machinery and 
equipment and $18.1 million-worth of stolen goods were returned to China (Rose 2005: 
42).  As Cold War tensions began to intensify, however, the U.S. government 
recommended to forgive reparations for fear of weakening Japan.  In a Peace Treaty with 
Japan in 1952 Taiwan agreed to waive reparations and, in 1972, the People’s Republic of 
China followed suit in a Joint Statement signed with Japan. 
  Although, as Rose (2005: 5) demonstrates, this left the door open for civil 
compensation, to this day, only a small number of Chinese victims have received 
compensation.  In general, the success rate appears to be better if a complaint is directed 
against a company, rather than a government, but even then a variety of criteria need to 
be met (claims must be in the hands of legislators rather than the judiciary; claims must 
be supported by a large group; claims must have merit, etc.) “for civil redress to be 
successful” (Brooks 1999 quoted in Rose 2005: 77-78).  Most cases are dismissed and, 
typically, judges either argue “that compensation claims were settled under international 
law, … that under the Meiji constitution the Japanese state cannot be held liable, or that 
the twenty-year statute of limitations makes the claims invalid” (ibid 96).   
  Whereas victims of Japanese atrocities have not fared very well when it comes to 
restitution, victims of the Nazi regime, comparatively, have done much better in their 
search for justice.  In 1947 U.S. occupation authorities launched the first German 
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to this day.  According to Bindenagel (2006: 294) the compensation programs provided 
by the FRG “were quite extensive” with the government paying “over $70 billion … 
directly to victims.”  Also, in the 1990s, Germany launched a “$700 million humanitarian 
effort” to aid victims of Nazi atrocities in Eastern Europe.  Negotiations among German 
business leaders, politicians, and victims of Nazi slave labor conducted between 1999 and 
2000 led to a $5 billion settlement (Bindenagel 2006: 301) which was widely perceived 
as just.  And, just this March, KarstadtQuelle agreed to pay $117 million to the 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany which had filed suit on behalf 
of the Wertheim family who—being Jewish--had lost its property in the late 1930s to the 
Nazis (New York Times March 31
st, 2007, B3).       
 
Apology/Settling the Past 
  Clearly, since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has issued 
numerous apologies for its conduct during the war, but, to this day, these apologies have 
not achieved the desired effect, i.e., improved Japan’s relations with its neighbors 
considerably.  Why is this the case? 
  As Rose (2005: 19) suggests, for an apology to be effective certain criteria must 
be met: “it must be offered with the backing and authority of the collective so that the 
apology is official and binding; it must be made publicly and on the record; and it should 
acknowledge the violation, accept responsibility, and indicate that there will be no 
  15repetition of such acts in future.”  Moreover, reciprocity may be a must since each time 
an outstretched hand is not seized a further opportunity is lost (Kaiser 2006: 92).
5     
In any event, an apology must be “meaningful” (Kristof 1998: 38), “genuine,” 
“sincere,” and “backed by actions” (Rose 2005: 100).  Over the course of several 
decades, Japan repeatedly has expressed “regret,” “keen responsibility for the suffering it 
has caused,” “remorse,” “sincere remorse,” “genuine contrition and deepest apologies” 
(Rose 2005: 101), but none of the apologies issued to date has been accepted by the 
majority of Chinese people.  During a visit to Tokyo at the end of 1998, for instance,        
Jiang Zemin “pressed for a formal ‘apology’ (owabi) and ‘remorse’ (hansei),” but, as 
Green (1999: 158-9) explains, only got hansei.
6  Similarly, apologizing to former 
‘comfort women’ in Korea in 1993, the Japanese government acknowledged “moral” but 
not “legal” responsibility (Rose 2005: 71).  
To make matters worse, many Japanese Prime Ministers have insisted on visiting 
the Yasukuni Shrine.  Obviously, Japanese citizens should be allowed to honor their war 
dead.  Ever since Class A (leading) war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978, 
however, any visit there by a Japanese Prime Minister represents a “political act of state 
recognition of the[se] souls” (Takahashi 2006: 156).  The crux of the matter, as 
Takahashi (2006: 175) explains, is that tens of thousands of Taiwanese and Koreans, who 
had been drafted into the Japanese military during the Asia-Pacific War, are also 
enshrined at Yasukuni.  These “victims of colonial rule by Japan [were enshrined] in 
precisely the same way as Japanese people who died perpetrating the colonial rule…as 
                                                 
5 For studies that argue that an apology does not require reciprocity, in fact, may be more 
effective unilaterally, see Long and Brecke 2003:26; and Suzuki 2007: 6.  
6 It is important to understand that there are different levels of apology in the Japanese 
language and that the exact wording chosen is crucial. 
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this is an insult” (ibid), and they therefore undertook legal proceedings to remove their 
relatives from enshrinement, but to no avail.
7                 
There are at least two ways in which the Japanese government could defuse this 
politically charged situation.  On the one hand, it could decide to create a politically 
“neutral” war memorial that would make no reference to Japan’s war criminals (Rose 
2005: 125).  Alternatively, Japanese Prime Ministers could “leave the commemoration 
and mourning of the souls enshrined at Yasukuni up to the priests at the shrine,” even if 
that would mean jeopardizing some domestic votes (Takahashi 2006: 157).   
  An analysis of apologies made by the German government to come to terms with 
the Nazi past shows that Germany has been much more successful in moving beyond this 
dark chapter in its history.  This, as Kaiser (2006: 91) makes clear, in large part, is due to 
the fact that the Germans recognized that “the acceptance of guilt in the past must not 
only be open and public, but, in order to be truly meaningful and effective, it must 
generate a formal apology.”  Case in point, former German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s 
reconciliation with the East.  While visiting the Warsaw Ghetto Monument in 1970, 
Brandt spontaneously fell to his knees, “[doing]”, as he later explained in his memoirs,  
“what human beings do when speech fails them” (cited in Teitel 2006: 105).  This 
“executive apology” was then followed by the signing of the Warsaw Treaty.   
  As part of the 1999-2000 settlement among German business leaders, politicians, 
and victims of Nazi slave labor mentioned above, German President Johannes Rau 
                                                 
7 Priest Ikeda rationalizes the refusal to remove the souls by arguing that “at the time 
when they died they were Japanese, so it is not possible for them to stop being Japanese 
after they died” (Takahashi 2006: 176).  As Takahashi is quick to point out, however, this 
completely ignores the fact that “the[se] people were semi-forcibly drafted into the war.”  
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money” (Barkan and Karn 2006: 23).  Rau told his audience, which included Holocaust 
survivors: “I know that for many it is not really the money that matters.  What they want 
is for their suffering to be recognized as suffering and for the injustice done to them to be 
named injustice.  I pay tribute to all those who were subjected to slave and forced labor 
under German rule, and, in the name of the German people, beg forgiveness.  We will not 
forget their suffering” (reprinted in Barkan and Karn 2006: 24).
8
  So then what lessons can Japan draw from the European experience?  “In the best 
cases,” as Barkan and Karn (2006:7) stress, “the negotiation of apology works to promote 
dialogue, tolerance, and cooperation between groups knitted together uncomfortably (or 
ripped asunder) by some past injustice.  … [An] apology can create a new framework in 
which groups may rehearse their past(s) and reconsider the present.”  To the extent that 
apologies can “amend the past” (ibid. 8), their psychological value is immense.  Germany 
seems to fit this “best case” scenario.  Having addressed its historical legacies and “by 
building a new, shared identity with former enemies,” Germany, in Lebow’s mind, has 
been able to “transcend, at least in part, [its] Germanness” (2006: 30).  Moreover, given 
that an “apology becomes an act of rehabilitation for the perpetrators and their 
descendants” (Barkan and Karn 2006: 17), “atoning for the war,” as Kristof (1998: 44) 
points out, “would not only liberate Japan’s neighbors; it would also free Japan itself.”
9  
                                                 
8 To live up to this pledge, the German government regularly provides money to 
education programs and memorials (Bindenagel 2006: 294). 
9 For an interesting study that advocates an apology as a new strategy, see Suzuki (2007: 
5-7).  He argues that Japan, as a democracy, has “greater political space…to debate and 
forward alternative interpretations of history.”  With time, an apology may lead to 
“collective identity transformations,” and help to “de-securitise” China’s identity.  
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Japanese cooperation.      
In the end, those who caution that East Asia is NOT Europe are correct.  Whereas 
World War II and the Cold War ended in Europe a while ago, the same cannot be said for 
East Asia—where several states are still embroiled in territorial disputes, etc.  And yet, 
there are important lessons East Asia can learn from Europe when it comes to creating a 
more solid basis for security integration.  As this paper has shown, historical legacies not 
only need to be addressed but dealt with in a particular manner to remove the big 
stumbling block these issues still represent for East Asia.  Specifically, studies of 
European reconciliation identify elements (remembrance, restitution, apology) essential 
in coming to terms with the past and thereby provide East Asia with a blueprint that it can 
follow and, where needed, modify to account for differences in timing, cultural 
heterogeneity, etc.  Moreover, as discussed elsewhere (Weber 2007), to achieve the 
remarkable stability the Europeans have enjoyed since the end of World War II, it 
appears to be beneficial, if not imperative, to coordinate security provisions on multiple 
levels and, over time, give rise to a complex web of governance that can allay suspicions, 
reinforce rules, and promote trust.  Finally, European integration demonstrates that 
spillover from one area of cooperation to another is likely, but, that it is also likely that 
there will be setbacks on the road to greater institutionalization.  
  Clearly, as mentioned previously (Weber 2007), East Asians are no longer solely 
relying on their bilateral security relations with the US, but also imbedding their security 
provisions in regional institutional structures.  The Asia Regional Forum (ARF) is no 
NATO or OSCE, but it does represent a step in the right direction.  Similarly, Japanese 
  19Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent conciliatory moves toward China are encouraging.  It 
is about time both Japan and China take concrete steps to deal with their historical 
legacies, remove remaining obstacles to cooperation, and move beyond talking.  If 
Europe is any indication, it is imperative to transcend historical divisions—rather than to 
remain “stuck in history”—in order to move the integration process along. 
  Conceptually speaking, if one seeks to understand why East Asian countries have 
given rise to the security structures in existence today, it is essential to “cross-fertilize” 
governance approaches with ideational and psychological analytical frameworks.  Reason 
clearly mattered in these decisions, but an accurate understanding of why the actors 
behaved the way they did cannot be obtained without examining their ideas and 
emotions. 
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